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MODERN REPUBLICANISM
AND THE HISTORY OF REPUBLICS
In the modern world there are some political theorists – for example,
so-called ‘rational-choice theorists’ – who make only the slightest use of
historical analysis in their normative political discourse. But there are
other theorists whose work depends in concrete ways on historical re-
search. One influential group of modern political thinkers, for example,
advocates of what is variously called civic humanism or republicanism,
advance their claims not merely through force of argument, but also
through interpretations of historical sources and texts. Modern republican
theorists claim that their movement is inspired by, or a revival and con-
tinuation of, a tradition of thought going back to antiquity, a tradition
labelled ‘classical republicanism’. The claim is not a trivial one, since
modern republicanism has sometimes presented itself as a ‘third way,’
contrasting itself with the more utopian claims of socialism, oriented to-
wards an ideal future, and liberalism, which treats the individual in ab-
straction from the history and traditions of his community.
1 Modern re-
publicans see themselves as realists grounded in history, reviving a set of
beliefs and practices that are possible precisely because they are known to
have been believed and practiced in the past. Philip Pettit lays out a pro-
ject to free citizens from various forms of dependence and arbitrary
power, enlarging the scope of self-government and equalizing power-re-
lations in society. He and his close ally, the historian Quentin Skinner,
I am grateful to my colleague Mark Kishlansky for reading this essay and helping im-
prove its style and argument.
1 See the introduction to Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Reflections, ed. by
James Hankins, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
I
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able resources that can inform the prudence of modern republicans and
designers of public policy. They have made the even stronger claim that
their notion of political liberty as ‘non-domination’ is a distinct concep-
tion of liberty that can be found in the thought and practice of premo-
dern republics, and that it should challenge and complicate the distinc-
tion between positive and negative liberty widely employed by
modern political philosophers since Isaiah Berlin’s classic essay of 1958.
2
The ‘non-domination’ concept of political liberty draws attention to
a type of liberty not covered by Berlin’s dichotomy, a freedom that is en-
joyed by persons who are not subject to other persons or groups that
have «the capacity to interfere in their affairs on an arbitrary basis».
3 This
type of freedom is neither freedom from interference with one’s choices
(negative liberty), nor self-mastery or self-governance (positive liberty). It
does not look to rights guaranteed by the state to protect certain zones of
autonomy, but aims to enlarge the scope of free activity by shaping laws,
institutions and customary norms in such a way as to equalize power in
society and reduce arbitrary forms of dominance, whether economic or
political.
4 Furthermore, for republican freedom to be compromised, it
is enough for the mere possibility of being dominated by an arbitrary
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2 PETTIT’S now-classic work is Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (PHILIP
PETTIT, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1997). For Skinner’s claims, see especially QUENTIN SKINNER, The republican ideal of political
liberty,i nMachiavelli and Republicanism, ed. by Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner and Maurizio
Viroli, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 293-309. In this earlier work,
Skinner sees classical republicanism as exemplifying an alternative approach to securing ne-
gative liberty, rather than a distinctive concept of liberty. Later in ID., Liberty before Liberalism,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, and other writings, Skinner refers to this ap-
proach as the ‘neo-Roman’ concept of liberty, distinct from the Aristotelian concept and the
modern negative concept. ISAIAH BERLIN’S essay, Two Concepts of Liberty, is most readily found
in his Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969.
3 PHILIP PETTIT, Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democracy,i nDemocracy’s Value, ed.
by Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordo ´n, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999,
p. 165. The historical roots of this concept were first explored by Q. SKINNER, The Idea of
Negative Liberty,i nPhilosophy of History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy, ed. by Ri-
chard Rorty, Jerome B. Schneewind and Quentin Skinner, Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1984, pp. 193-221, revised under the title The Idea of Negative Liberty: Machiavelli
and Modern Perspectives,i nI D., Visions of Politics. Vol. II: Renaissance Virtues, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002, pp. 186-212.
4 See PHILIP PETTIT, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency, Ox-
ford, Oxford University Press, 2001.power to exist in a polity. An absolute king, even one who is virtuous
and just, takes away his subjects’ freedom (and therefore their happiness)
by the very fact that he is absolute. Pettit, following Skinner, holds that
this ‘non-domination’ concept of liberty, before liberalism, was the chief
way in which liberty was understood and practiced in the classical repub-
lican tradition from the Roman republic to the British Commonwealth
of the seventeenth century.
5
The historical claims of modern civic republicans have not gone
without their critics – most notoriously, the scorched-earth approach
of David Wootton. He has claimed, in effect, that the notion of a repub-
lican tradition is factitious in the logical sense, i.e. that the words ‘repub-
lic’ and ‘republicanism’ have been used to describe historical phenomena
so diverse that they can have no common essence.
6 In a similar vein is
Dario Castiglione’s warning that searching for the ancestry of modern
ideas inevitably results in a kind of tunnel vision. He observes that mod-
ern republican theorists, in search of a usable past, have a tendency to re-
ify eclectic and ad hoc arguments into a unified ‘republican tradition,’
and suggests that we should rather speak of several distinct republican-
isms.
7 The goal of the present paper is different. Its purpose is to inves-
tigate the historical claims of modern civic republicans more concretely,
by examining the writings of political thinkers of the Italian Renaissance.
The aim will be simply to find out whether the characterization of pre-
modern republican thought by modern republican theorists is accurate. I
shall be concentrating primarily on the question of whether Italian Re-
naissance humanists have a conception of liberty as non-domination, and
whether there is evidence for the related claims that premodern repub-
lican theorists regarded virtue and the active life as instrumental to ac-
quiring this form of liberty.
8 I shall also question whether Renaissance
ideas of liberty can be as easily separated from notions of hierarchy and
elitism as modern republican theorists seem to assume.
5 Q. SKINNER, Liberty before Liberalism cit., esp. pp. 49-55.
6 DAVID WOOTTON, The True Origins of Republicanism: the disciples of Baron and the counter-
example of Venturi,i nIl repubblicanesimo moderno. L’idea di repubblica nella riflessione storica di
Franco Venturi, a cura di Manuela Albertone, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 2006, pp. 271-304.
7 DARIO CASTIGLIONE, Republicanism and its Legacy, in «European Journal of Political
Theory», IV (2005), pp. 453-65, an extended review of Republicanism: A Shared European
Heritage, 2 voll., ed. by Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2002.
8 See especially Q. SKINNER, The republican ideal cit., p. 303 sgg.
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lates to the position of Machiavelli with respect to Renaissance political
thought. His brand of political prudence is, to be sure, highly character-
istic of one tendency within a broader Renaissance culture, but he is by
no means a typical Renaissance political thinker. In fact the most impor-
tant political thinkers of the Renaissance are Aristotle and Cicero, or
more precisely, Aristotle and Cicero as they were understood by the Re-
naissance. Renaissance humanists before Machiavelli who composed for-
mal works on political topics, such as Coluccio Salutati, Pier Paolo Ver-
gerio, Leonardo Bruni, Poggio Bracciolini, Matteo Palmieri, Bartolomeo
Platina, Francesco Patrizi and Aurelio Lippo Brandolini all operated
within a broad Christian Aristotelian framework and used humanist ver-
sions of Aristotelian and Ciceronian political terminology. Machiavelli,
while dealing with the same set of problems, consciously challenged, re-
jected and overturned the whole approach to politics developed by his
humanist predecessors, particularly their highly conventional ideas about
virtue and justice. In substantive terms he had much more sympathy with
popular government than any of his forebears, and he was far more cri-
tical of Christianity than any writer of his time. Thus for most of the six-
teenth century Machiavelli’s political writings were less influential than
those of Aristotle and Cicero. The greatest of the humanist writers on
politics, the Sienese writer Francesco Patrizi, though unknown today,
was far more popular than Machiavelli for most of the century. Patrizi’s
works on republican and princely government were printed 37 times,
translated into all the major European languages and reduced to epitomes
for classroom use.
9 Patrizi was uncontroversial, the voice of conventional
humanist wisdom, the darling of schoolmasters throughout Europe. Ma-
chiavelli’s floruit as an author, judged in terms of the number of editions
of his works, did not come till the last quarter of the sixteenth century.
Even then the spread of his ideas about statecraft was viewed with alarm
in many quarters, even with paranoia, and he was the subject of virulent
attacks well into the seventeenth century.
10 ‘Machiavellian’ was an adjec-
tive of vituperation, rather than praise.
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9 JAMES HANKINS, Exclusivist Republicanism and the Non-Monarchical Republic, in «Political
Theory», XXXVIII (2010), pp. 451-482.
10 ROBERT BIRELEY, The Counter-Reformation Prince: Anti-Machiavellianism or Catholic Sta-
tecraft in Early Modern Europe, Chapel Hill-London, University of North Carolina Press,
1990.Clarifying the place of Machiavelli in Renaissance political theory is
necessary, as modern theorists of the non-domination model of liberty
build their edifices to a surprising extent on the single example of Ma-
chiavelli.
11 Machiavelli of course is the only Renaissance political theorist
who belongs to the modern canon of political works read in universities,
so it is natural that he should be emphasized. Nevertheless, it needs to be
recognized that in most respects he was an outlier from the mainstream of
humanist writings on politics – mostly written in Latin – beginning with
Petrarch and Salutati and continuing at least to Lipsius. Despite the use of
Machiavelli by later writers like Harrington, it is misleading to think of
him as typical, or even paradigmatic, of the Renaissance humanist tradi-
tion of political reflection.
12 He is to the Renaissance what Ptolemy of
Lucca is to the scholastics: someone who shares sources and language
with his contemporaries, but whose methods, conclusions and wider
moral outlook differ sharply from theirs. Machiavelli was the most origi-
nal political writer of the Renaissance. For that reason, if for no other, he
was sui generis.
How was political freedom understood by most humanist writers of
the Renaissance who were sympathetic to non-monarchical govern-
ment? The writings of Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit and their followers
prepare us to find therein some version of the non-domination model,
for example, the idea that one must engage in the active life of the citizen
in order to prevent becoming the victim of arbitrary power and of ex-
ploitation by the powerful; that law and institutions should be designed
to prevent domination of society by the powerful and to help the weak
secure their negative liberty. On this view the actions of the powerful
need to be placed on view in the public forum, discussed and contested
by the people. This was clearly a lesson that Machiavelli took from Ro-
man history and one certainly finds echoes of it, in debased forms, in ac-
tual republican practice during the Renaissance. One of Lorenzo de’
Medici’s famous sayings, was «it is ill living for the rich in Florence unless
they rule», meaning they need to be active politically to avoid being sha-
ken down by the popolo or by hostile clientage groups. Less famous voices
spoke of ‘play-to-pay’ situations, where your interests and those of your
11 See Q. SKINNER, The republican ideal cit., esp. p. 301 sgg.
12 On this point see also ERIC NELSON, The Problem of the Prince,i nThe Cambridge Com-
panion to Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by James Hankins, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2007, pp. 319-337.
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rivals from monopolizing public contracts or imposing unfair tax bur-
dens. As they say in the American Congress, if you’re not at the table
you’re on the menu. All this is consistent with a non-domination model
of liberty (even if the examples cited suggest it was a model practiced by
dominators as well as the dominated).
However, we are not interested here in republican practice so much
as in the ways formal humanist texts discuss the question of republican
liberty. The issue most commonly arises in the context of a courtly de-
bating theme about the relative merits of republics and monarchies. The
best-known example is probably that found in Book IV of Castiglione’s
Book of the Courtier. Here Castiglione was merely summarizing the discus-
sions in Francesco Patrizi’s Latin treatises on republic and princely educa-
tion, a staple for his humanist readers. Patrizi and other fifteenth century
authors like Aurelio Lippo Brandolini raised the question whether all
power should be concentrated in the hands of a single individual, suitably
restrained by law, or whether it is possible to justify a power-sharing ar-
rangement such as that found in Renaissance oligarchies.
13 By far the
commonest argument in favor of this was the one that might be called
the argument from the distribution of virtue. In Patrizi’s treatise on re-
publican education, he argued that there are cases where Aristotle’s re-
quirement for monarchy – that there be a single individual or family
of outstanding virtue – is not met; one can find, says Patrizi, cases where
a state has many virtuous individuals but no one of outstanding virtue. In
these cases it would be unjust to place any one individual ahead of the
rest.
14
The assumption here (as elsewhere) is that virtue, understood as self-
mastery, is a title to rule. This view was standard among humanists,
whether republican or signorial. Virtue in humanist writings is not, as
moderns republicans believe, merely a prophylactic against dominance
by others. Behind Patrizi’s position is the logic of rationalistic ethics,
the most important ethical model inherited from classical philosophy.
The virtues are defined as a set of habits or behavioral patterns that soli-
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13 FRANCESCO PATRIZI’S treatises, De institutione reipublicae libri novem (written in the
1460s) and De regno et regis institutione (1470s), frequently published in the sixteenth century,
have no modern editions. I will cite them by book and chapter number. For Brandolini’s
Comparatio reipublicae et regni, see AURELIO LIPPI BRANDOLINI, Republics and Kingdoms Compared,
ed. by James Hankins, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 2009.
14 FRANCISCI PATRIZII De institutione reipublicae cit., I.dify the control of reason over the passions and appetites. As applied to
the larger theater of the state, the rule of virtue requires identifying a wise
and virtuous prince or an aristocracy to rule the passionate and appetitive
parts of society. Behind this lay the classical assumption that nature arrays
mankind into natural pyramids of moral ability, with a few wise and vir-
tuous individuals at the narrow top and the passionate and vicious many
on the broad bottom. Moral excellence is something few can achieve. It
is by nature a scarce good unequally distributed. Indeed, it is only because
of its scarcity that it can be used as a claim to rule. If all were equally vir-
tuous, or equally capable of virtue, the argument that the virtuous should
rule would be trivial or useless. The argument, then, presupposes a mer-
itocratic rather than an egalitarian outlook. Furthermore, in a good so-
ciety the wise and virtuous rule, but for some Renaissance humanists this
licensed a situation similar to some modern Marxian and socialist models,
where enlightened rulers permit themselves to coerce ignorant subject
populations in what is allegedly their own interest. For example, in most
Renaissance republics the idea of differential virtue and prudence under-
wrote a graduated citizenship and a graduated deliberative process.
15 Ide-
ally, the wise and virtuous should formulate policy, whilst the many
should only have the right to a yea-or-nay vote on policies formulated
by their betters.
Indeed, the wider assumptions that lay behind these historical argu-
ments for republican government would seem to be incompatible with
a non-domination model of liberty. For the Italian humanists, whatever
guarantees of legal equality a republic might grant individual citizens,
there is no entitlement to self-rule independent of merit. Those inferior
in virtue are properly ruled, even coerced, by the virtuous. Renaissance
republics like Florence and Siena may in practice have chosen office-
holders by lot, but the Renaissance humanists generally disapproved of
this practice precisely because it ignored the claims of virtue.
16 They pre-
ferred election and other presumptively meritocratic forms of selection,
rather than allowing chance, fate or Divine Providence to choose a po-
15 See for example UBERTO DECEMBRIO, De republica libri IV, Milano, Biblioteca Am-
brosiana, Ms. B 123 sup, f. 90r (Book II); BALDASSARRE CASTIGLIONE, Il libro del Cortegiano,
4 voll. (1508-1516); FRANCESCO PATRIZI, De institutione reipublicae cit., I, VIII; FRANCESCO
GUICCIARDINI, Discorso di Logrogno,i nA THANASIOS MOULAKIS, Republican Realism in Renaissance
Florence, Lanham (MD), Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, pp. 121-129.
16 For example MATTEO PALMIERI, Vita civile, a cura di Gino Belloni, Firenze, Sansoni,
1982, p. 136.
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possessed an intrinsic dignity qua human that gave them a title to self-rule
and political autonomy. Dignity – worthiness – was something earned,
not ascribed. The more merit one displayed, the more one was entitled
to liberty and self-government. It will be noticed that this form of elitism
is more commonly associated with positive liberty than with negative lib-
erty – or with republican liberty as described by Pettit and Skinner.
It is worth noting that this argument from the distribution of virtue
was also extended to humanist discussions of international relations and
the morality of empire. In Leonardo Bruni’s Panegyric of the City of Flor-
ence and in his History of the Florentine People he advances the argument
that Florence can justify her empire in Tuscany because she surpassed
all other Tuscan peoples in virtue. All city-states by nature desire free-
dom, but not all are worthy of it, and those unworthy were justly domi-
nated by more virtuous states.
17 This attitude, widely found in the fif-
teenth century, points up another of the difficulties facing modern
civic republicans. Modern republican theorists take it as axiomatic that
domination (or ‘alien control’) of one state by another is suboptimal,
18
but many Renaissance humanists did not see a contradiction in desiring
liberty for themselves and dominance over others. «Dominion and lib-
erty, for mortal men nothing is more dear nor more welcome than these
two things», ran a famous fourteenth century adage.
19 It was not until the
time of Francesco Guicciardini and later Fabio Albergati that some re-
publican theorists articulate a moral critique of free cities that imposed
their rule on subject cities.
It is true that Bruni in the Panegyric and in his History tries to maintain
that the Florentine subject cities were sometimes more free after submit-
ting to Florence than they had been under their previous oligarchic and
tyrannical governments. But his argument is based on the Florentines’
imposition of the rule of law. The subject cities in the Florentine terri-
torial state lost much of their power of self-determination, particularly
in foreign policy, and Bruni believed that this promoted harmony in
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17 For example LEONARDO BRUNI, History of the Florentine People, 3 voll., Cambridge
(MA), Harvard University Press, 2001-2007, II, p. 326; VII, § 48.
18 PHILIP PETTIT, A Republican Law of Peoples, in «European Journal of Political Theory»,
IX (2010), pp. 70-94.
19 See MIKAEL HORNQVIST, Two Myths of Civic Humanism,i nRenaissance Civic Humanism
cit., pp. 105-142: p. 112.old Etruria. His claim that the subject cities were protected from arbitrary
actions of powerful individuals by the rule of law is limited, however, by
his exempting one powerful individual in particular, namely the Repub-
lic of Florence. As the subject cities were inferior in wisdom and virtue,
they were expected to take direction in foreign relations from Florence.
Florentines should try to do their best to persuade their allies and subject
towns of the wisdom of Florentine policy, but in the end those towns
had no legal or political recourse preventing their being ordered, for ex-
ample, to provide troops for Florentine wars. This is clearly an argument
incompatible with a non-domination model of liberty.
The argument from distribution of virtue is not, to be sure, the only
argument deployed by Renaissance humanists in favor of republican lib-
erty. Nearly as important was what might be called the argument from
history. This argument is indebted to Cicero’s De officiis and other ancient
texts but was elaborated upon by a number of Renaissance republican
writers, and has remained popular in the republican tradition to this
day. It was first powerfully articulated by Leonardo Bruni in his Oration
for the Funeral of Nanni Strozzi (1427), and later echoed by Bartolomeo
Scala in his Defense against the Detractors of Florence (1496) and other wri-
ters. In the Strozzi oration Bruni goes so far as to deny legitimacy to
monarchies and aristocracies on the grounds that such forms of govern-
ment have never in fact existed; they belong to a null set; all monarchies
and aristocracies that claim to be such are actually masks for tyrannies and
oligarchies. By process of elimination this leaves popular government as
the one truly good government: Bruni is clearly thinking here of Aristo-
tle’s constitutional typology of the three good and three bad constitu-
tions.
20
Of course this is an invalid argument, as there can be no guarantee
that the constitution left over is virtuous, and Bruni does not bother to
argue that it can be. He is writing a panegyric, not a treatise.
21 The argu-
ment he advances is not theoretical but historical. Bruni is making what
logicians would call a rash generalization, basing his conclusions about re-
20 Leonardo Brunis Rede auf Nanni Strozzi: Einleitung Edition und Kommentar, hrsg. von
Susanne Daub, Stuttgart - Leipzig: Teubner, 1996, p. 285. The same argument, clearly de-
pendent on Bruni, is used by BARTOLOMEO SCALA, Defense against the Detractors of Florence,i n
Essays and Dialogues, ed. by Renee ´ Neu Watkins, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University
Press, 2008, pp. 252-254, § 17.
21 JAMES HANKINS, Rhetoric, history and ideology: the civic panegyrics of Leonardo Bruni,i n
Renaissance Civic Humanism cit., pp. 143-178.
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her greatest moments of military power and cultural glory in the period
between the expulsion of the Tarquins and the battle of Actium; the im-
perial period was one of moral corruption and imperial decline; hence
the best form of government is that of a free people.
22 Borrowing from
Sallust, Bruni claimed that the reason for the success of the Roman re-
public was its characteristic freedom to participate in public life, which
led to a virtuous circle of competition for glory and empire amongst rival
great men. Monarchs, by contrast, are said to be suspicious of virtue in
their subjects. So a virtuous republic is preferred because it leads to the
success of the state vis a ` vis other states. This might remotely be called
a kind of non-domination model of liberty, in that liberty here prevents
the republic from being dominated by other states. But note that the his-
torical argument does not claim to show that republican power-sharing
protects all citizens within the state from the power of overmighty oli-
garchs. In the Roman case, as Bruni well knew, liberty to participate
in politics led to gross inequities of political power. The dynamics of
competition for glory in Rome positively encouraged and corrupted
power-seeking individuals in the late republic, leading to the loss of lib-
erty for most citizens. This was something Bruni chose to ignore; but hu-
manists advocating monarchy were quick to emphasize it.
23 Roman his-
tory thus became an arena for testing the proposition that republican
liberty could enable a state to dominate rival states, a proposition that
Bruni, like Machiavelli, accepted and indeed championed. Of course
to dominate other states means not to be dominated oneself, but this is
hardly a basis for foreign affairs with which modern republican would
be comfortable.
24
In addition to the argument from the distribution of virtue and the
argument from history, the humanists also articulated an argument for re-
publican liberty based on its ability to provide what we would call nega-
tive liberty, or freedom from interference. The definition of liberty most
commonly quoted by republican theorists prima facie sounds rather like a
negative concept: it is Cicero’s definition in Paradoxa Stoicorum 34, that
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22 The argument is found in L. BRUNI, History cit., Book I, pp. 48-54, and also in his ear-
lier Laudatio Florentine urbis, a cura di Stefano Baldassarri, Firenze, SISMEL, 2000, pp. 15-19.
23 One example of many: FRANCESCO PATRIZI, De regno cit. I, XIII, who gives a sharply
anti-republican review of the century before the Caesars came to power.
24 See, by way of contrast, P. PETTIT, A republican law of peoples cit.liberty is a power of living as you will. However, in its original context
this definition does not align with the modern non-interference concept,
since Cicero further explains that for the Stoics, ‘living’ in the true sense
of the word would be to live rationally in accordance with nature and
human duty; the way to do this is to act with virtue, so we are returned
to the self-mastery model of virtue and liberty. The definition does not
allow room for the unconstrained pursuit of unspecified private ends; hu-
man ends are already given by Nature. Yet Renaissance republican thin-
kers often forgot or ignored this context, possibly because they often
quoted it indirectly from the jurist Baldus de Ubaldis, who added to
the definition of liberty as a power of living as you wished the words
«within the limits set by law and custom».
25 Baldus thus takes a Stoic
paradox about the equivalence of liberty and rationality and makes it into
something more like a modern non-interference concept, a definition
which establishes a zone of unconstrained behavior within boundaries
set by law and decency.
Bartolomeo Scala quotes the definition in this form in his Defense of
Florence Against Detractors of 1496. In this oration, written during his more
populist, ‘Savonarolan’ phase, Scala says the purpose of both monarchies
and republics is to seek peace and security of living for their citizens and
the «faculty of managing their own affairs in accordance with their per-
sonal will and with the private advantage of each».
26 This is the obverse of
Scala’s statement a few pages earlier where he says,
I think that, whenever men have united, they did so not for someone else’s
sake but for their own, and when they serve the common interest, they do so to
derive their personal advantage from the public one. It is wrong, however, to
infer from this that private advantage is to be put before public good. For truly,
if private good is better and more easily to be found when the public good is
served, who can doubt that the latter must be preferred even for the sake of
the former? But this is no time to discuss the nobility of ends (§ 15).
This sounds at first glance like Skinner’s instrumental common good:
one serves the common good so in order to preserve one’s liberty to pur-
sue private ends. But note that liberty is not praised because it is an in-
strument to protect our private interest. In his panegyric to liberty a few
pages later (§ 18), Scala praises liberty in traditional terms, as a «divine and
25 For example, FRANCESCO PATRIZI, De institutione reipublicae, I, IV.
26 B. SCALA, Essays cit., pp. 254-256, § 19.
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honorable ornament (decus) and prerogative (praerogativa) of our nature».
The expression prerogative or prescriptive right, of our nature suggests
that Scala may have believed, unlike other humanists, that all human
beings (not just Florentines) are entitled to liberty, but he follows this
statement by admitting:
But it is not enough, you will say, to want to be free, as most of us do; but
to have learned how to become free and to make use of freedom: that is what is
truly splendid and worthy of a free mind.
Scala then proceeds to make an argument that Florentines prefer repub-
lican government because it is an instrument to promote liberty and be-
cause they fear tyranny, both of the one and of the few. (Aristocracy is
said to be the constitution that promotes virtue, but according to Scala
it slips too easily into oligarchy). Both kingship and republican govern-
ment seek «peace and security [...] and the ability of each [subject or ci-
tizen] to manage his own affairs according to his personal will and his
ability to manage his own affairs». Both forms of government, not just re-
publican government, aim at allowing citizens to pursue their private af-
fairs freely. Scala’s prefers republican government because it serves every-
one’s private interest better than monarchical government does. But this
is not because it fosters civic virtue, but because its institutions are less
easily corrupted. For example, republican deliberation is slower, less pas-
sionate, fairer and better informed than the deliberation of royal courts.
27
It is more likely to lead to stability – that key criterion of constitutional
excellence according to Aristotle – because stability is more in the interest
of republican citizens than of royal counselors.
There is not a word here about not wanting to be dominated or to be
subject to another’s prerogative, nothing about the extra-legal exercise of
arbitrary power, nothing about the need to participate in government
and exercise civic virtue as a means of protecting one’s private ends.
28
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27 Needless to say, monarchical theorists such as AURELIO LIPPO BRANDOLINI made the
same claims for monarchies vis a ` vis republics; see his Republics and Kingdoms Compared
cit., esp. II, § 8-9; II, § 17; III, §§ 30, 51.
28 The claim that monarchies are more corrupt on the surface might be taken as a com-
plaint about arbitrary domination of citizens by powerful individuals, but the modern under-
standing of a polity that aims at non-domination is concerned with structures – laws, policies
and socio-economic institutions that enable domination of others – not the corruption of
such structures.Scala’s goal for states is that they provide stability and freedom from in-
terference in the pursuit of private interest. If a monarchy, however ab-
solute, can accomplish those ends, then it too will have achieved the pur-
pose of government. Scala’s claim is simply that the institutions of a
republic like Florence are better suited to secure the private freedom ne-
cessary to pursue one’s own interests. What is wrong with monarchy is
not that the monarch might exercise power over the citizen in an arbi-
trary way, but that the institutions of monarchy such as royal councils and
courts are less effective in promoting the citizen’s free pursuit of his or
her private interests. The objection to them is instrumental rather than
ethical.
We seem to get closer to a non-domination concept of liberty in Ala-
manno Rinuccini’s anti-Medicean dialogue of 1479, the Dialogus de lib-
ertate.
29 This work advanced the same Ciceronian definition of liberty as
that used by Scala, but unlike Scala, Rinuccini was aware of its context in
Stoic thought. Rinuccini knew that the definition presupposes a concept
of self-mastery, and that living as you will really means living the way
you ought to live, having a reasoned plan of life, living rightly in accor-
dance with reason and duty and obeying rather than fearing natural law.
Difficulties arise, however, when one tries to participate in politics under
a tyrant. When political life is corrupt, one can only engage successfully
in politics by being equally corrupt. The tyrant’s overwhelming power
makes it impossible to speak truth freely before him. The man of integ-
rity is either punished and excluded from power or he must retire to the
country and cut off all ties with the active life of politics. (The latter is
what Rinuccini himself had done, having refused to perform a corrupt
act for the Medici, and the dialogue is meant to justify his political quiet-
ism to friends urging him to re-enter public service.) For the man of in-
tegrity in a corrupt state (as Rinuccini says, following the De officiis), lib-
erty becomes an inner state, a kind of spiritual fortitude that enables one
to resist the temptation to yield to corrupt influences and keep an un-
blemished soul. So Rinuccini’s case at first sight looks like a magnificent
example of a free man refusing to be dominated by arbitrary power.
In the end, however, his idea of freedom is not really akin to what
modern republicans mean by a non-domination concept of liberty. Ri-
nuccini has an affection for a (no doubt imaginary) buon tempo antico
29 ALAMANNO RINUCCINI, La liberta ` perduta: Dialogus de libertate, a cura di Francesco
Adorno, trad. it. Giuseppe Civati, Monza, Vittone, 2003.
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virtue. He approves the actions of the Pazzi conspirators who tried to kill
the tyrant Lorenzo and restore that republic of the mythical past. But by
liberty Rinuccini really means the power to live a morally good life, and
this Stoic ideal is ultimately designed to be independent of the status rei
publicae, i.e., its constitutional form. That, in a way, is the whole point.
Improving the design of laws and institutions to minimize dependency
and increase equality might be desirable, but this will not increase liberty
in the true, inner sense of the word, for this liberty can only be achieved
as the result of philosophical and moral training. The active life of politics
is at best a matter of duty. It is not a source of human perfection but
rather a threat to it.
This brings us to the issue of the active and contemplative lives. Here
we find a marked difference among modern historians and theorists. The
older civic humanist strain of thought typified by the historians Hans Bar-
on and John G.A. Pocock saw Renaissance republicans as having pro-
moted a particular vision of the good life. Through the active life of
the citizen in politics and military affairs, through living a life of civic vir-
tue, a man engaged in the active life could achieve the human good. This
meant that citizenship, self-governance and civic virtue were all intrinsi-
cally valuable aspects of human flourishing. In other words, republican
liberty in the Renaissance, on this view, was tantamount to positive lib-
erty in Isaiah Berlin’s sense.
30
Quentin Skinner rightly saw that this older view imposed an Aristo-
telian and Greek finality upon texts that could not bear that interpreta-
tion; civic participation and self-governance in the Renaissance did not
ordinarily subserve perfectionist goals.
31 The reason for this, I would sug-
gest, is simply that the goal of human life in the Renaissance was sup-
posed to be the province of religion, and most humanists avoided direct
challenges to orthodox Christianity. Human perfection by definition
could not be achieved in this life through human power, though some
humanists like Bruni, following a famous quotation from Cicero’s Dream
of Scipio, suggested piously that great virtue in the active life would be
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30 The classic works are HANS BARON, The Crisis of the Italian Renaissance: Civic Human-
ism and Republican Liberty in an Age of Classicism and Tyranny, 2 voll., Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1955, rev. ed. in one volume 1966, and JOHN G.A. POCOCK, The Machia-
vellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1975.
31 Q. SKINNER, The republican ideal cit., pp. 302, 306-307.rewarded by beatitude in the next.
32 In any case, Skinner and other mod-
ern republicans understand the active life of political participation, civic
virtue and self-governance to be instrumentally valuable for preserving po-
litical liberty, construed as non-domination. Vigilant and virtuous citi-
zenship, commitment to the active life, protected personal liberties
against the invasions of arbitrary power.
As we have seen, this conception of the active life as an instrumental
good is one that works better for Machiavelli than for most other huma-
nist theorists. This is the case in part because the humanists understood
the active life in a rather broader sense than is found in Aristotle or even
Cicero. As was fitting in an age of commercial republics, Renaissance ci-
vic humanists often included commercial and private economic activity
in the realm of the active life, as in Leon Battista Alberti’s dialogues on
the family or Bruni’s commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian Economics.
On the other hand, the active life of the citizen and its virtues are also
commonly praised by humanists in the service of princely regimes; it is
quite mistaken to think that ideals of citizenship were the exclusive prop-
erty of republican theorists. Advocates of monarchy like Bornio da Sala
or Francesco Patrizi (in his pro-monarchical voice) and Ottaviano Frego-
so in the Courtier even use the terms vivere civile or vivere libero to describe
political life under virtuous princes. In this broader sense of the active life,
clearly, it cannot be construed simply as an instrumental safeguard of re-
publican liberty.
Nevertheless, even when we are talking about republican writers, and
even when the latter confine themselves to the active life of politics, it is
doubtful whether modern republican theorists correctly state the typical
humanist view of the active life and civic participation. The most popular
quotation cited in humanist discussions of the active life comes from
(pseudo) Plato’s ninth letter (358a), where, writing to Architas, who
was tempted to withdraw from politics, Plato says «that none of us is born
for himself alone; a part of our existence belongs to our country, a part to
our parents, a part to our other friends, and a large part to circumstances
that command our lives. When our country calls us to public service it
would be unnatural to refuse». As filtered through Cicero’s De officiis this
quotation is typically used to urge young men to enter public service and
avoid a retired life of study or private endeavor. However, the many Re-
32 S. DAUB, Leonardo Brunis Rede auf Nanni Strozzi cit., p. 302. See CICERO, Somnium
Scipionis 16, 24, 26.
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life of involvement in public affairs will lead to happiness and human
flourishing on the Aristotelian model; in fact they commonly present
public life as a disagreeable burden. But neither do they induce people
to enter public life as a necessary evil, in order to protect their private
interests and those of their kin and clients. Instead, the active life is pre-
sented, in the manner of the Stoics, as a duty that must be fulfilled. Hu-
man beings are not isolated persons but intrinsically social; they are born
into families and clientage networks and cities and into a religion; each of
these relationships implies duties, obligatory actions, which are discover-
able by reason. These duties may be well done or badly, and the man
who loves goodness and the God of Nature will do them well. He will
earn the gratitude of those around him and win glory among posterity.
These are real inducements. However, fulfilling one’s duties does not
bring him beatitude in the next life; Christian theology taught that only
God can give that. While Christian theology precluded a perfectionist
value being attributed to the active life, it was probably rhetoric that pre-
vented any use of the instrumentalist argument. Idealistic young men,
then or now, are not ordinarily inspired to enter public service by being
told it is a useful hedge against powerful enemies. That is a message to be
whispered in the study, not shouted in the forum, and Renaissance hu-
manists were usually, in their imaginations at least, speaking in the pre-
sence of the populus Romanus Quirites.
In short: Among Italian Renaissance humanists who wrote on politics
there was no ‘republican tradition’ characterized by a consistent commit-
ment to liberty, construed as non-domination, and aiming at the pursuit
of private ends. The humanists were too deeply influenced by Greek phi-
losophy for that. Non-domination arguments can be extracted from Ma-
chiavelli and perhaps other sources, but this is an insignificant strand in
the tradition of humanist political thought as a whole.
The question remains, however, whether in the end this should mat-
ter for modern republicans. The answer to this question depends on
what, exactly, a modern theorist believes the history of political thought
is for. There is, to be sure, an imaginative appeal in the idea of a premo-
dern republican tradition to which we can return. Especially if one starts
from the idea that modern progressive politics has come to a theoretical
impasse, there is appeal to the idea that we can retrace our steps, identify
a wrong turning, and start over – it is the kind of appeal that is behind
books such as Pocock’s Machiavellian Moment, Alasdair Macintyre’s After
Virtue, or even Foucault’s Les mots et les choses, which aims to show the
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al.
33 There is appeal too in the idea that the past has something to offer
the present, that it is not just a strange, unhappy country populated by
moral monsters with whom we cannot possibly identify and who cannot
be made to agree with us – the past of some progressive thinkers in our
time. There is a longing to believe that our own age does not have all the
answers and that previous ages did not get everything wrong.
Apart from this imaginative aspect, however, it should not matter
very much to modern republicans that most Renaissance writers on pol-
itics do not have a non-domination concept of liberty. After all, we are
only talking about, at most, two hundred years of a tradition of thought
going back to the Romans, and I for one am not prepared to say that a
non-domination concept is not applicable to Cicero or Sallust or Tacitus,
still less for the seventeenth century writers discussed authoritatively by
Quentin Skinner in his classic Liberty before Liberalism. The non-domina-
tion concept, or something very like it, does seem to be found in Ma-
chiavelli, and that is not trivial. But for those interested in finding a
non-domination concept of liberty in the Italian Renaissance, it would
be best to turn away from the formal writings of humanists and look
at the grubby practice of Renaissance republican politics. There one
can find many republican statesmen struggling to keep their liberties
and those of their clients in the face of powerful combinations of wealth
and prestige, a situation not unlike the one that concerns modern neo-
republicans. Politically active citizens of Renaissance republics, like their
forebears in the medieval popular commune, devoted much effort to
finding legal and institutional means to limit the influence of the power-
ful, or at least to prevent the dominance of any one party or individual.
34
This was not, however, a major interest of the Renaissance humanists
who wrote on politics and who dominated intellectually the period from
Petrarch to Machiavelli and beyond. Their outlook was that of educators,
not theorists, and their focus, in politics as in ethics, was on virtue. Vir-
tuous rulers made any number of laws and institutions unnecessary; and
laws and institutions, no matter how good in themselves, were useless
33 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, University
of Notre Dame Press, 1984
2;M ICHEL FOUCAULT, Les mots et les choses: une arche ´ologie des sciences
humaines, Paris, Gallimard, 1966.
34 A fine recent overview of Florentine political conflicts is JOHN M. NAJEMY, A History
of Florence, 1200-1575, Oxford, Blackwell, 2006.
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ent from that advocated by modern republicans. For them, education in
virtue was the key to a successful polity; it was worth more than any
number of laws, regulations and policies; it transcended the whole ques-
tion of constitutions and even of political liberty. The humanists saw lib-
erty as the reward of virtue, not its precondition; it was something to be
merited, not a prescriptive right. All this seems foreign to our modern
sensibilities. But that is not to say that the humanists’ political thought
is irrelevant to the modern world.
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